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1. Background 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of 
Africa1 has exacerbated conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and elsewhere in the region.  Small arms availability has
aggravated the degree of violence by increasing the lethality and duration of hostilities, and the 
resulting culture of violence has obstructed peace efforts and delayed the launching of economic 
and social recovery in post-war societies in the regio
region have lacked the capacity to deal with illicit supplies and trafficking, and even now, their 
capacity is limited.  The lack of alternative livelihoods for those who are involved in armed 
groups, as well as general insecurity, have meant that individuals and groups are reluctant to 
surrender the weapons in their possession.
 
A conference in Nairobi in March 2000 for ten countries from the Horn and Great Lakes sub
regions resulted in the Nairobi Declaration (ND
information and co-operate in matters relating to illicit small arms and light weapons and to 
exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons.   In 
order to support implementation of the Nairobi Declaration, as well as the DRC peace process, 
the Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU) of UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR) established the GLR Small Arms Regional Programme (SARP) in January 
2002. The programme aims to build awareness of the problem of small arms proliferation in the 
Great Lakes within UNDP and its partners in the region, enhancing understanding of the impact 
on longer term development, integrating responses to the problem into UNDP’
programming and developing specific projects to tackle small arms proliferation. 
 
Since its inception, changing realities in the region have influenced the direction of the project.  
The original project concept was heavily focused on the co
surrounding region, but lack of progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
in DRC created few opportunities for concrete activities. More recently, however, the deployment 
of the UN Organization Mission to Congo (MONUC), the commencement of the DDRRR 
programme, and the involvement of donors in the Multi
Reintegration Programme (MDRP) has created a window of opportunity in the region, while at 
the same time increasing the num
within these processes with respect to SALW activities still remains unclear.  Furthermore, the 
gradual operationalization of the Nairobi Secretariat (NS) during 2003 has created a serious 
regional partner through which SARP’s regional participation could be enhanced.
 
2. Assessment Process 
The initial project foresaw monitoring and evaluation throughout project implementation, but 
there has been little systematic monitoring since mid
during the entire project. An internal assessment is therefore long overdue, and is considered 
particularly desirable in view of political developments in the region, the emergence of key 
partners, and the need to review progre
to end in December 2004, and assessment will help with strategic planning on the way ahead. 
 
This preliminary assessment has constrained itself to taking stock of progress achieved and 
challenges identified so far, and to the development of limited recommendations for the future of 
                                               
1
 For the purpose of this project, the Great Lakes Region has been defined as all the countries directly involved in the 
DRC conflict and the countries that suffer impact of the DRC conflict through refugees, increased cross
trafficking and violence. 
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the project, both for the remainder of the year and in a possible second phase. Terms of 
reference can be found at Annex 2
 
The purpose of assessment can be summarized as follows:
 The identification of tangible achievements;
 The identification of options for SARP’s future direction.
Originally a full external impact evaluation was considered, but this is no longer considered 
necessary at this stage for reasons outlined in Section 9. However, an independent impact 
evaluation involving the Regional Bureau could still be useful at the end of the current project, if 
combined with a needs assessment.
 
The BCPR/SADU Regional Liaison Specialist, 
to Nairobi during the period 16
methodology included the following elements:
 Interviews with stakeholders;
 Interviews with other partners;
 Interviews with all current SARP staff and one former staff member;
 Interviews with UNDP Kenya country office;
 Questionnaire distributed to UNDP country offices in the region (replies only received 
from Tanzania and Burundi);
 Review of project documentation and reports;
 Review of project finances.
 
This report reviews SARP’s progress against its stated objectives, but also identifies key 
successes, obstacles, areas for improvement and options for the future.  It does not provide a 
systematic record of all of SARP’s activities
rather highlights certain activities where it is felt that these have contributed to the realisation of 
objectives or generation of lessons learned. Recommendations can be found in Section 9.
 
3. Mandate and start-up 
3.1 Mandate 
As previously explained, SARP was originally established to tackle small arms proliferation 
arising from the DRC conflict, and, as such, was heavily focused on the DRC and the 
surrounding countries affected by the conflict.  Neverth
objectives outlined in the project document are considerably broader in scope.  As defined in the 
project document, SARP’s goal is 
arms proliferation and availability in the Great Lakes Region”
as follows: 
 
1. Integrate development related aspects of small arms problems into agreed international 
development community policies and development programmes in the Great Lakes;
2. Raise national and international awareness of the humanitarian impact, and wider socio
economic and development costs of small arms problems in the Great Lakes;
3. Strengthen the capacity of country programmes in the Great Lakes region to understand 
and analyse small arms proliferation and respond;
4. Design and implement country and regional programmes in the Great Lakes to address 
small arms proliferation. 
 
In spite of these rather general objectives, the programme has largely been seen through the 
lens of the DRC conflict. As a result, slow institutional processes in the transition phase on the 
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DRC side were seen as an obstacle for implementation across the board for SARP.   Faced with 
these difficulties, SARP has shifted its emphasis from the impact of the DRC conflic
processes in the region during the last year, but has not sought to redefine SARP’s goals or 
developed flexible annual strategies or workplans to guide this process.
 
3.2 Establishment of the programme
SARP was designed to run for a three
difficulties with the recruitment process the programme was not begun until May 2002.  
Recruitment continued even after this date so that the programme was not fully ope
at least half a year after the intended start date.  As a result, activities were also delayed.  The 
SARP team also faced a number of challenges in establishing a functioning project office (see 
Section 8), which set the programme back still
not able to launch programme activities until at least eight to nine months after the anticipated 
start date.  
 
In the early phase of the project, a regional assessment was conducted which was to form the
basis of planning and programming for the next three years.  The regional assessment was a 
useful document but difficulties between the assessment team, BCPR and some country offices 
in the region undermined the value of the initiative and reduced the qua
The failure of the assessment team leader to fulfil the terms of his contract was particularly 
damaging. Furthermore, it is possible that a number of personal and institutional relationships 
suffered as a result of this exercis
 
Following the development of the regional assessment, a BCPR/SADU mission was fielded to 
Nairobi to assist the team with the development of a strategy and workplan, and to provide some 
orientation and training for the staff.  Again, this was useful and helped create a framework for 
future activities.  However, the development of both the Project Document and the Strategy could 
be seen as a top-down approach in which a vision was imposed from headquarters w
sufficient input from the region, in part due to the delay in the production of the final report from 
the regional assessment because of the difficulties outlined above.  The Strategy also created a 
workplan for UNDP as a whole, and did not differen
BCPR. As a result, the relevance of the Strategy was called into question and was largely 
ignored in the day-to-day programming and planning of the regional programme.  As a result, 
and as will shown below, SARP’s ap
been ad hoc and opportunistic in nature.
 
3.3 Scope 
In terms of geographical scope, the regional programme was developed to cover the countries 
affected by the DRC conflict, which were taken to comprise 
Republic of Congo, Uganda, Republic of Congo (RoC) and Tanzania.  The Central African 
Republic is not formally part of the project but nevertheless features prominently in the Strategy. 
Kenya was not considered part of the proje
This has been a source of some confusion, and has prevented SARP from capitalizing on 
progress made in Kenya on small arms control, both by UNDP and by other organizations.  
Meanwhile, interaction with other players focusing on the Great Lakes region, including donors, 
has sometime been difficult due to the fact that they more often operate from Kinshasa.  Lastly, 
SARP’s geographical scope does not fit with that of the Nairobi Declaration, which includes 
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea, but does not include RoC.  This has also created 
difficulties for SARP in its support to the Nairobi Secretariat, one of its mandated activities. 
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However, these difficulties should not be overstated, and in gener
been or could be found. 
 
4. Overall impact 
Before delving into progress made against objectives, it is useful to look at the overall picture in 
the region and the views of key partners and stakeholders.
 
4.1 Overall benefit to the region
During discussions, key partners identified the following elements as evidence of SARP’s overall 
benefit to the region: 
 Mainstreaming small arms issue in humanitarian frameworks;
 Capacity development among NGOs and civil society organizations;
 Parliamentary process; 
 Support for the Nairobi Secretariat and Friends of the Nairobi Declaration;
 Technical advice and assistance to country offices (where provided).
 
Most identified awareness raising to be the most visible benefit brought by the project, 
positively about the events organized by SARP in this regard.  Capacity building with NGOs and 
CSOs was also considered to be of value for the region, including through the DRC workshop 
and the Training of Trainers workshop organized by Saferworl
Many partners considered the process of engagement with parliamentarians to be particularly 
innovative and useful, and cited it as clear evidence of SARP’s value added.  SARP’s support to 
the Nairobi Secretariat staff throug
chairmanship of the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration (FND) was considered to have been 
useful, although it was felt that more could be done here.  
 
Rather more intangibly, the regional nature of the pro
benefit to the region.  Regional processes such as the parliamentary dialogue or the Training of 
Trainers workshop have an important confidence building impact that goes far beyond the control 
of small arms.  The mere fact that representatives (be they non
parliamentary) from previously hostile countries have been able to sit down together and discuss 
highly sensitive issues can be considered an achievement in itself.  Some partners highlight
this affect as SARP’s main benefit for the region, although it is perhaps not a central goal for the 
project. 
 
4.2 Political challenges 
There is no doubt that SARP has been operating in a difficult and challenging environment, both 
in logistical and political terms.  These have presented considerable problems, some of which 
SARP has been able to overcome, but most of which have severely ha
deliver planned outputs effectively. 
 
Continuing volatility and instability in the Great Lakes region make activities on small arms and 
light weapons difficult and sometimes even dangerous to implement.  However, moves towards 
peace in a number of countries in the region have created a number of opportunities in the last 
year. Nevertheless, a lack of political will among governments of the region remains a major 
stumbling block, especially for initiatives at country level. Increased 
way towards addressing this problem, and the efforts of the Nairobi Secretariat have also proved 
useful in this regard.   
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5. Progress against objectives
The project document included a few indicators against which to measure pr
the objectives. 
 
5.1 First objective 
 
Integrate development related aspects of small arms problems into agreed international 
development community policies and development programmes in the Great Lakes. 
Indicators of success: 
 Adoption of National and Regional small arms policies.
 Policies of UN System for the Great Lakes Region formulated in the context of inter
agency mechanisms such as CASA, IASC, etc. 
 National Strategies or small arms reduction plans developed in at least four countri
in the Great Lakes Region.
 
Overall, significant process has been made in the region towards the agreement of small arms 
policies and the integration of the issue into policy frameworks.  Within the context of this 
assessment, it is difficult to assess 
efforts of other organizations have contributed to this process. 
 
A number of countries in the region have moved closer towards the development of small arms 
policies and action plans, largely in ord
framework of the Nairobi Declaration.  Most ND signatories have established national focal 
points and some have begun to develop national action plans. In this, they have received 
considerable support from Saferworld, SaferAfrica and SRIC, through a grant provided by the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID); SARP has not played a substantial role 
in these processes. However, SARP has provided support and assistance to the Nairobi 
Secretariat through the provision of some training and advice. This has been a useful 
complement to the support provided by the two NGOs and has been viewed positively by the NS. 
There is a desire within the NS to continue this relationship.
 
Although SARP cannot be said to have fully achieved this rather ambitious objective, the 
programme has had some success in mainstreaming the small arms issue into planning 
processes of other UN agencies, notably OCHA.  Here, SARP succeeded in integrating the small 
arms issue into the contingency planning process co
include small arms control as a priority issue within the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).  
Although this latter achievement did not help SARP mobilize resources, it may have helped 
increase awareness of the small arms issue, both within the UN family and among donors.  
 
However, much of the progress made under this objective has been opportunistic in nature, and 
is not the result of a coherent strategy.  Some of the planned outputs 
the organization of a regional UNDP country office workshop to review best practice and distil 
lessons learned.  This may be because country offices in the region were not always receptive to 
SARP’s advances, but a more concerte
UNDP CO staff.  A focus away from lessons learned, which was perhaps premature, and 
towards training, awareness raising and capacity development, might have helped in this regard.  
The development of materials such as operational guidelines would certainly also have been 
helpful, but this did not take place.
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5.2 Second objective 
 
Raise national and international awareness of the humanitarian impact, and wider socio
economic and development costs of small
Indicators of success: 
(1) Small Arms and Light Weapons issues related to GLR featuring in national and 
international media. 
(2) National awareness strategies developed and implemented in four countries in GLR.
(3) Broad-based government programmes initiated, featuring multi
 
There is little doubt that awareness of the humanitarian impact of small arms and light weapons 
has increased substantially in the Great Lakes region, but again it is difficult to differentiat
between the impact of SARP and that of other organizations working on the issue.  Saferworld, 
for example, has done much to increase awareness among government officials, and the impact 
of the ND and the strenuous diplomatic efforts of the NS in recent m
forgotten.  
 
It is probably fair to say, however, that SARP’s activities have contributed to increased 
awareness, especially among policy circles and among national non
(NGOs).  One of SARP’s key activities, t
April 2003, seems to have had a significant impact on media reporting on the small arms issue, 
and helped generate media attention towards the issue. However, it was not possible to conduct 
a systematic review of media activity during this assessment. 
 
SARP has focused on the development of awareness among civil society and has proved adept 
at identifying civil society partners, in the form of NGOs, CSOs and parliamentarians.  Additional 
activities that have helped meet this objective include the civil society training workshop for DRC, 
held in Kinshasa from 28-39 May 2003 and organized with the Congolese NGO Groupe d’Action 
pour las Démobilisation et la Réinsertion des Enfants Soldats de la RDC (GADERES
workshop helped build a civil society network in DRC that will become useful as the country 
programme moves into an operational phase, but it was not possible to support activities that 
built on the event in its immediate aftermath.
 
Finally, SARP has pursued a strategy to raise awareness among parliamentarians of the 
problems posed by small arms proliferation. A workshop co
Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) in Mombasa in November 2003 went surprisingly well, and 
helped generate considerable political will among parliamentarians for tighter arms control 
legislation (both domestic and external).  More importantly, perhaps, it provided an opportunity 
for policy-makers from across the region to sit down together for the fi
an event in terms of confidence building and peacemaking should not be underestimated. 
Opportunities have arisen that will allow SARP to build on progress made in Mombasa, such as 
the AWEPA-organized meeting for parliamentarians
Bujumbura from 29-30 March 2004.  National initiatives will now be crucial in order to translate 
commitment into action. 
 
A number of other outputs have been developed that help contribute to the realization of this 
objective, including the production of brochures, t
some other outputs which might have reached a wider audience have n
SARP newsletter and a SARP website, although SARP does contribute articles to the Nairobi 
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Secretariat newsletter. One destruction event that was organized by the Kenyan government 
with the support of UNDP to mark the anniversary 
the Nairobi Declaration helped generate some attention in Kenya, but no other destruction 
events have been organized by the programme in the region. 
 
There have been some successes in meeting this objective, b
largely been ad hoc.  Although SARP has created a strategy for communications and 
sensitization, activities have been relatively sporadic, usually consisting of one event in one 
country or at the regional level, and there h
although awareness may have been raised among political elites, relatively little has been done 
at community level or with the general public. It is difficult not to conclude that opportunities have 
been missed.  In general, it would perhaps be fair to say that SARP has made progress on the 
first indicator, but there is little evidence of any progress on the second and third indicators.
 
5.3 Third objective 
 
Strengthen the capacity of country programmes in 
and analyse small arms proliferation and respond.
Indicators of Success:  
(1) Development impact of small arms proliferation successfully incorporated by UNDP 
Country Offices in the region into various UN planning tool 
UNDP Country Reviews, etc at least in 4 countries.
(2) SALW mainstreamed in UNDP and other donor operations in the region.
(3) Nationally agreed small arms assessments developed.
 
Much of the focus of the original project document has b
arms programmes through the UNDP Country Offices (COs) in the region.  This assumed a 
certain level of interest and commitment on the part of these COs, which was in many cases 
difficult to sustain. 
 
Some progress has been made against the first indicator.  For example, SARP supported the 
inclusion of small arms control within the Kenya UN Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF), which is a significant achievement that has proved to be a challenge els
the Burundi CO, small arms have also been included in the UNDAF, probably as a result of 
SARP’s awareness raising activities if not its advocacy.  Naturally, in order to reap the full benefit 
of such mainstreaming, SARP and others will need to 
capitalize on its inclusion in UNDP programming structures.  
 
In terms of the second indicator of success, little progress has been made.  However, it should 
be stressed that this was perhaps somewhat unrealistic giv
arms issue within UNDP and other development organizations.  Furthermore, policy is often 
agreed at headquarters level so policy changes could only be relatively limited at the regional 
level. Nevertheless, it seems t
objective, especially through increased liaison and interaction with COs, and through the 
organization of awareness raising or capacity building workshops for CO staff.
 
The project document envisage
regional and country level that were intended to build the basis for future programming.  A 
regional assessment was conducted at the outset of the programme, but this was organized by 
BCPR before SARP was fully operational, and therefore cannot be considered an output of the 
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regional programme.  Some project formulation missions have been conducted by the SARP 
team in Rwanda, Western Tanzania, DRC, and Burundi, as well as numerous project formulation 
missions to Republic of Congo (RoC). These have no doubt been valuable, but few concrete 
results have materialised.  The reasons for this may be numerous and are too complex to 
explore within the framework of this assessment, but again, a lack of sustained
part of most UNDP country offices is certainly a contributing factor.  
 
What is unfortunate is that SARP did not undertake small arms assessments in any of the 
countries covered by the programme; such assessments might have helped increas
understanding of the small arms issue among UNDP staff and could have provided evidence to 
justify small arms interventions.  It should be noted, however, that the situation in some countries  
(e.g. DRC, Burundi) was not stable enough for assessments to 
Saferworld/SaferAfrica have conducted mapping exercises in a number of countries in the region 
that may or may not be useful substitutes for such assessments.  At the very least, it would be 
useful to build on the work done by Sa
could be secured. 
 
Finally, some assessments on aspects of policy would also have been of benefit for future 
programming.  For example, a SARP project was designed to support field and inter
collaboration among customs agencies, but it never came to fruition in spite of considerable 
donor interest.  The project was certainly unrealistic and needed considerable revision; a 
planned assessment would have helped in this regard.  It is unfortunate t
not found to move this project forward, and to conduct similar assessments on other aspects of 
small arms policy. 
 
5.4 Fourth objective 
 
Design and implement country and regional programmes in the Great Lakes to address 
small arms proliferation.  
Indicators of Success:  
(1) A significant number of UNDP projects addressing small arms proliferation issues 
successfully developed. 
(2) Considerable number of weapons collected and destroyed with UNDP support.
(3) Reducing significantly the direct and 
availability on human development in the areas of support.
 
It is not entirely from the outputs listed under this objective in the project document whether the 
focus here was limited to DRC and the countries
to cover all countries of the region and aspects of the small arms problem.  Whichever is the 
case, SARP is only now able to make a substantial contribution to the formulation of national 
UNDP country programmes on small arms, with the exception of Republic of Congo, where 
SARP assisted in the drafting of three project documents, of which one was eventually funded by 
the EU. SARP has had recent successes with the development of a pilot phase country project i
Western Tanzania and the development of a workplan for the small arms component of the DRC 
Community Recovery project.  SARP is also advising the Burundi CO on the development of a 
national project.   
 
However, in general, progress has been slow and hamp
and the nature of political processes in the region.  In DRC and RoC, the development of a 
national DDR strategy and the involvement of the World Bank through the MDRP respectively 
10
 
take place. At this stage, 
ferworld in this regard, assuming Saferworld’s agreement 
hat an opportunity was 
indirect impacts of small arms proliferation and 
 
 impacted by the DRC conflict, or it is intended 
ered by the involvement of other actors 
 
 interest on the 
e 
-agency 
 
n 
  
 
have made it difficult to develop l
been useful to test approaches and generate lessons learned.  Therefore it seems fair to say that 
the indicators of success have not been reached and this project objective has not been met. 
However, opportunities now exist to make significant progress on the first indicator, and SARP 
could build on progress made in DRC and Western Tanzania to develop similar pilot initiatives 
elsewhere. 
 
6.  UNDP relationships 
6.1 Headquarters support 
As outlined above, BCPR/SADU played the central role in drafting the project document and the 
original Strategy document. SADU later provided some training and orientation to the SARP 
staff, which was considered useful, and continued to provide backstoppin
to the programme.  However, there do appear to have been some difficulties in the relationship 
with SADU.  SARP staff felt that the training provided was inadequate; it is also the view of this 
assessment that all programme staff wou
building on the substantive issues, project management, communications and capacity 
development, as well as on UNDP procedures and practices.  
 
There was also a perception from some staff that SADU support
SADU played a strong role in the development of the project and perhaps tried to direct the 
project from Geneva, which was understandable given SARP’s limited capacity at the time, but 
the manner in which this was done certai
the other hand, there was a long period (almost one year) when SADU did not provide any 
support to SARP due to changes in staffing. At least one monitoring visit should have taken 
place in 2003. In general, this points to a need for more consistent support from SADU.
 
The Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) was substantially involved in the design of the Document 
through the provision of technical assistance and input, and through the provision of USD 
100,000 from TRAC 2 funds.  RBA’s involvement was no doubt instrumental in the early phase 
and helped ensure complementarity with UNDP’s programming in the Great Lakes region.  
However, later on during the implementation, RBA was no longer centrally involved.  
the highly political nature of the work undertaken by SARP and the complexities of the region, it 
would be wise to bring RBA back into the discussion about SARP’s future.
 
6.2 Country Offices 
One of SARP’s primary aims was the development of nat
region. Progress made under this objective has been outlined above, but the relationship with the 
UNDP COs warrants further examination. In general, interest displayed by UNDP COs in the 
regional programme has been sp
incentive.  Only two country offices responded to the questionnaire prepared for this assessment. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo:  
sheer scale of activities and support that was needed in the country.  Furthermore, the 
involvement of major international players in DRC, such as the World Bank in DDR activities and 
the subsequent establishment of the MDRP complicated relations and
However, these relations have now improved significantly with the fielding of a SARP/SADU 
mission to Eastern DRC in recent weeks, and SARP is committed to the provision of key inputs 
to the DRC Community Recovery project.
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Republic of Congo:  A strong relationship was established early on with the RoC CO, and SARP 
fielded a number of technical assistance missions to provide input into the development of small 
arms and DDR projects. The SARP programme officer was detailed to the Brazzav
period of one month to provide backstopping for the development of the national DDRRR 
programme. SARP also made a provisional commitment to provide seed funding of USD 
150,000 to the RoC CO for a cross
and the Repatriation and Reintegration of DRC Ex
additional USD 142,000 for a DDR advisor. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to either 
programme the USD 150,000, and the CO was disappointed wi
to identify suitable candidates for the DDR post. However, agreement has recently been reached 
between SARP and the CO on this issue.
 
Burundi:  Two missions to Burundi were conducted relatively early on in the project and 
backstopping and technical advice was provided.  The Burundi CO also managed to integrate 
small arms into the UNDAF with SARP support, although in the absence of a Resident 
Representative for some time little attention was paid to the issue.  No concr
undertaken, although it is arguable that the situation was not ripe for an intervention at this stage.  
Again, the situation improved with the arrival of a new RR, and a planned Gender, Small Arms 
and DDR workshop and assessment, which 
pilot project. Care should be taken to ensure complementary with BCPR/ Transitional Recovery 
Unit’s activities on reintegration. 
 
Uganda:  SARP has not initiated any activities in Uganda.  There is a perc
on the part of the government in the small arms impacts of the DRC conflict, while the UNDP CO 
has not so far focused on problems related to the Karamojong and the LRA in Northern Uganda. 
These were seen by SARP as falling outside th
although the cross-border dimensions of these issues would lend themselves well to SARP 
intervention. Opportunities for engagement could also arise as a result of the upcoming BCPR 
mission. 
 
Rwanda:  Technical assistance missions have been fielded to Rwanda but as yet no concrete 
activities have been developed. There is a perception within SARP that other international actors 
in the country are playing a leading role and that there is a little for SARP to contribu
messages have also been received from different government authorities on the Small Arms 
situation.  Here, an assessment could be useful in identifying ideas for pilot projects.
 
Tanzania:  In the early stages, SARP did not focus on Tanzania, in 
SaferAfrica were very active in the country already.  However, an opportunity for UNDP 
involvement was identified in Kigoma, and SARP has provided technical assistance and advice 
for the design of a small arms project in Western
community based weapons recovery approach. 
 
7. Partnerships 
There is a variety of organizations and actors active on small arms issues in the Great Lakes 
region and SARP has established partnerships with a number of t
of actors and the various approaches used has sometimes created a complicated picture within 
which SARP has often struggled to find its niche.  A division of labour among the different 
organizations has not been established
added and comparative advantage on small arms programming within a development 
perspective.  
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7.1 Nairobi Secretariat 
During its first two years of operation, the Nairobi Secretariat (NS) was not fully
lacked the capacity, and indeed the political will, to take a more proactive approach to 
implementation of the Nairobi Declaration.  In the last year, however, the arrival of a new Co
ordinator has signalled a new era in the NS’s work.  Th
successful in bringing governments of the region on board, and has supported the creation of 7 
out of the 10 National Focal Points. Furthermore, the Secretariat has secured new funding for the 
next three-year period to 2007.  The Secretariat has received considerable technical assistance 
from Saferworld, and, to a lesser extent, from SARP.  However, the Secretariat’s capacity 
development needs are still great, particularly in terms of staff development and training.  SARP 
has also provided support to the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration (FND) group, although the 
group has functioned more as an information exchange mechanism than as a resource and 
project mobilization forum. SARP could usefully help reinvigorate the FND by 
and issues to its attention. 
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why a stronger relationship between SARP and the 
NS may not be feasible at this time. First, as previously explained, the Secretariat has received 
considerable support from Saferworld and SaferAfrica in terms of capacity building and 
programming, and these two organizations are named implementers as per the terms of the 
Secretariat’s DFID grant.  Since DFID is also one of SARP’s main funders, and SARP is also 
mandated to support the NS, it would have been useful if DFID’s funding strategy had insisted on 
better co-ordination with SARP. Secondly, SARP’s objectives and target countries differ 
substantially from those of the Nairobi Secretariat. However, there may be sco
operation on project related activities, where the political input of the Nairobi Secretariat could be 
useful in discussions with governments.  The FND could also be used for resource mobilization 
and awareness raising.  
 
7.2 Governments 
Very limited contacts have been established with governments of the region.  There may be 
three valid reasons for this.  First, UNDP should liaise with governments primarily through the 
COs.  Secondly, the Nairobi Secretariat maintains contacts with government on 
small arms control.  Thirdly, international NGOs have somewhat “cornered the market” in the 
provision of technical advice and assistance to governments (see below).  However, there is a 
strong case for enhanced SARP interaction with gover
launch pilot projects and achieve sustainability in programming.  Regular courtesy calls to 
National Co-ordinators for small arms and National Focal Points would be useful when SARP 
staff travel on missions.  Discussions with government officials during the design of pilot projects 
are also essential.  Both should be facilitated through UNDP country offices.
 
7.3 Non-governmental organizations
The relationship with Saferworld (SW) and its sister organization SaferAfr
special attention since they are major players on small arms control in the region.  Both 
organizations have focused their activities on co
through training, capacity development and the provision
drafting.  The approach taken by these organizations differs substantially from that of SARP, 
which perceives it to lean too much towards a one
various merits or drawbacks of SW/SA’s approach are not a subject of this assessment, the 
differing approaches have sometime brought the two sides into conflict.  
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Both organizations are extremely active in the region and provide substantial support to both 
governments and the Nairobi Secretariat.  At times, SARP and UNDP in general are unsure 
where they contribute, and, as one interviewee noted, “UNDP is in danger of becoming an 
implementing agency for Saferworld”.  SARP has established a productive relationship with 
Saferworld, partly as a result of the Training of Trainers workshop and through contact 
maintained at the headquarters, but also through some contacts made by SARP itself.  This is a 
positive development, but a clear division of labour needs to be established with SW/SA.
particular, SARP should focus on those aspects in which it has a comparative advantage, 
especially development focused approaches to small arms control, operational small arms 
control projects at the country level, and community based capacity developm
 
There are also a number of national NGOs working on small arms control in the region.  As part 
of its capacity development mandate, SARP has provided some training and capacity building to 
national NGOs, but has not been able to provide direct fundi
capacity to use the expertise and knowledge available within national NGOs has been limited.  
Although SARP should not become a donor for NGOs, it could consider providing limited seed 
funding for projects developed in c
contribute to attainment of SARP’s regional objectives, or where approaches could be tested 
nationally for replication at a regional level.
 
7.4 UN Family 
The regional programme has maintained contacts with a number of UN agencies and 
programmes.  Relations with the Office for the Co
the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have been particularly strong, and ha
focused on mainstreaming and on operational co
with both UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
although there have been no joint activities to date.  Given SARP’s mainst
unfortunate that stronger links have not been established with these two critical organizations, 
although this can often be a challenging process. 
 
Some contact has been established with the Office to the Special Representative of th
Secretary General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes conflict, and SARP staff members have 
participated in preparatory meetings for the Great Lakes Peace Conference.  This forum offers a 
number of opportunities for awareness raising and advocacy on small arms co
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); SARP could seize these opportunities in 
the next few months by organizing a side event at the first conference meeting and by preparing 
briefing materials and brochures for dissemination.
 
8. Management and administration
8.1 Management 
The SARP project team faced a number of challenges during the establishment of the 
programme, some of which they were able to overcome through key successes.  Foremost 
among these has been the establishment of a 
fact that there were no established procedures to follow, and the fact that no provision had been 
made in the project document for operating costs.  When the project document was developed, it 
was assumed that the Kenya CO would be able to cover these costs but this was never 
discussed in detail between the CO and BCPR.  Nevertheless, the SARP staff dealt with this 
situation well and was able to establish a functioning office relatively quickly.
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The project team also established good relations with the Kenya CO, which has been helpful with 
a number of aspects of the project.  Political support from the Resident Representative has been 
particularly beneficial.  There have, however, been some difficulties o
because the CO had no experience with the establishment of regional programmes, and 
therefore had no established procedures for SARP to follow.  This has been overcome through 
time, but administrative issues have persisted. In
such as travel authorizations or residency applications have taken longer than expected due to 
delays at the CO. 
 
SARP project management has suffered from the fact that little training and support was offered 
to the team, and, in particular to the Project Co
project management experience and no experience with the practices and procedures of UNDP.  
At the same time, the project brought together a diverse group of pe
backgrounds, which made interaction and communication challenging. 
 
As a result, there have been a number of difficulties in the management of the project.  These fall 
into three main categories: strategic planning, information sharing
foremost among these has been the overall lack of strategic direction and planning.  Although 
the Project Document and Strategy became less relevant over time, little effort was made to 
follow annual workplans.  Those workpla
to allow the Project Team to respond to opportunities as they arose or modify activities to suit the 
changing environment. As a result, workplans themselves also lost their relevance, and SARP 
operated in a more ad hoc and opportunistic manner.  SARP’s activities became largely reactive 
in nature and did not fit into an overall strategy. This then had a knock
management of staff in the team, where the absence of a clear workplan m
create a workable division of labour among the staff.  Although the Project Co
endeavoured to delineate staff responsibilities, activities were not fully co
led to overlaps, gaps, and worse, a competitiv
 
Information sharing and communication has also been a particular problem for the project team, 
although the Project Co-ordinator did establish procedures such as regular staff meetings. The 
perception was that Information was 
and the staff members, and among the staff members themselves.  Members of staff often 
worked in isolation on different projects without keeping team members adequately informed, 
with the result that projects stalled when staff left. 
 
Ultimately, the responsibility for intra
lies with the Project Co-ordinator, who is in charge of establishing procedures and practices that 
the staff must follow in the daily work. It is clear that the Project Co
benefited from some management and teambuilding training at an early stage.  Furthermore, 
guidelines on all aspects of project management would have been useful for the entire team.
 
8.2 Personnel 
Personnel issues have presented particular problems for SARP.  As explained above, the staff 
recruited to the project had only very limited UN and project management experience; they also 
had relatively little experience in their respective
direction from the Project Co-
challenging environment.   
 
High staff turnover has plagued SARP since the earliest months and has contributed to a lack of
continuity in activities.  Part of the reason for both this and the relative lack of experience among 
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staff members is the nature of staff contracts: all international staff apart from the Project Co
ordinator are UN Volunteers (UNVs), and can be easily t
paid jobs. However, discontent among staff has also been a motivating factor.  Clearer 
responsibilities and more formalized management structures might help overcome some of these 
difficulties. 
 
SARP’s current staffing situation is not ideal.  The Communications and Awareness Raising 
Officer is leaving at the end of May , but will be now replaced as new funds have been freed up. 
The Capacity Building Officer was not replaced when the last incumbent left in October 2003 
the responsibilities of this post were assumed by the Programme Officer.
 
8.3 Financial management and resource mobilization
 
8.2.1 Financial management 
As previously explained, the original budget for the project was not well conceived and did not 
include funds for fundamental operating costs.  SARP therefore had to shift funds from other 
budget lines and make a number of budget revisions.  This was done in accordance with 
established procedures and budget revisions on the basis of new allocations w
with the Country Office and with BCPR. Although a full audit is beyond the scope of this 
assessment, financial management has generally been satisfactory and there are no serious 
issues regarding budgetary matters.
 
However, budget revisions appear to have been reactive in nature to cover immediate needs and 
did not follow a clear strategy.  Budget projections have been somewhat lacking.  As a result, the 
programme is now low on funds for projects at this stage, which is unfortunate since 
possibilities for projects have materialised recently.  
 
Another problem is related to responsibility for budget management, which has almost entirely 
fallen to the Project Co-ordinator.  This has had two effects.  First, the Project Co
become involved in the details of financial management, which has perhaps not been the best 
use of his time, and should have been the responsibility of the Programme Officer.  Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, there is a perceived lack of transpa
the programme budget; staff members do not have a clear understanding of the resources 
available to them for programming in their particular issue areas, and do not have responsibility 
for their own budgets.  This has prevented p
and has perhaps contributed to the reactive nature of SARP’s work. 
 
8.2.2 Resource mobilization 
In terms of resource mobilization, SARP has not suffered any serious problems and has 
managed to mobilize adequate resources for programming.  The original proposal was to secure 
Belgian funding to cover the entire cost of the programme; in fact, the Belgian pledge for a 
project focusing on DRC within a broader regional perspective was the main impetus behind t
creation of the programme in the first place.  However, it soon become clear that the Belgian 
government was in favour of an integrated small arms and recovery project, which meant that 
their funds could no longer be used to support the Great Lakes regi
its initial start-up phase.  Therefore, the Belgian contribution was eventually used for the DRC 
Community Recovery project and the funding for the small arms component of that project (USD 
980,185 programmable) was channelled thr
management arrangement later proved unworkable, and the funds have now been transferred 
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directly to the DRC CO, but it is recommended that SARP keep a close eye on programming and 
financial management since responsi
 
The contribution of TRAC 2 funding from the Regional Bureau was an important step in the 
inception of the project, but did not ultimately ensure RBA ownership and Country Office 
ownership.  It also meant that CO decided no
Belgian government provided a separate contribution of around USD 300,000.  BCPR made a 
commitment to provide the remainder of the funds through the Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
(CPR) Thematic Trust Fund (TTF), and resources from Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and 
Germany (this last being seed funding for RoC) were used.  SARP currently has a shortfall of 
approximately USD 450,000. A summary of allocations is provided at 
 
9. Recommendations 
9.1 General recommendations and conclusions
This assessment report shows that SARP has faced considerable political and logistical 
difficulties during its two years of operation.  As a result, there is little doubt that
has been low for a project of this size.  There are a number of reasons for this which have been 
outlined above and relate to the original programme design, the political situation, the role of 
UNDP COs, the involvement of other internat
and the role of BCPR.   
 
It is the opinion of this assessment that a further impact evaluation would not be worthwhile at 
this stage.  Although an impact evaluation is always desirable, it is only a valuable to
have been sufficient tangible activities on the ground to be appraised.  Although SARP has 
undertaken a number of activities, these are generally intangible and have focused primarily on 
awareness raising and political dialogue.  Concrete activ
Furthermore, given that this is a regional programme, the impact will also be regional in nature, 
and thus highly diffused and difficult to measure.  Therefore, an evaluation would almost certainly 
focus on process rather than impact and would therefore be limited to a progress assessment.  
Although it would certainly be able to go deeper than this current assessment, it would be difficult 
to justify the financial outlay for another assessment round.  This need not preclude a 
depth evaluation at a later stage, possibly combined with a needs assessment.
 
Therefore, this assessment makes the following recommendations for the future:
1. BCPR/SADU and SARP should draft a detailed workplan for the remaining eight 
months of the current project. This workplan should follow the new template and 
should programme the necessary resources for each activity. The workplan should be 
based on current projected activities for the remainder of the year, as well as ideas 
listed under Section 10.
2. On the basis of this workplan, SARP and BCPR/SADU should revisit SARP’s current 
budget projection and resource allocation. Particular attention should be paid to 
human resource questions.  Although this will be determined by the workplan, it is 
recommended that the Programme Officer receive a regular contract and at least one 
additional professional staff member be recruited on SSA, either as a UNV or as 
national staff. 
3. BCPR/SADU should maintain regular phone and e
weeks) with SARP on the implementation of activities outlined in the workplan. 
Written reports should be provided to BCPR/SADU every two months.
4. BCPR/SADU should initiate a consultation process with UNDP COs, RBA, donors 
and other stakeholders on needs and
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5. BCPR/SADU, in consultation with SARP and RBA, should review the need for a 
second phase.  Ideas for a potential new phase can be found in Section 11.
 
9.2 Strategy for May – December 2004
SARP already has a number of activities planned
1. Follow-up to parliamentary consultation process at the country level, especially in DRC.
2. Community Recovery activities in DRC:
a. Training for Community Recovery project staff
b. Small arms baseline assessment in Eastern DRC
3. Activities in Burundi: 
a. Gender and small arms assessment and workshop
b. Pilot project on small arms control
4. Activities in Western Tanzania: support to the PA phase project
a. Assistance with development of a communications and/or awareness raising 
strategy 
b. Assistance with capacity development
 
A number of additional activities could be considered from the following list (as well as any others 
developed by the project itself): 
1. Support for UNDP country offices
a. Additional small arms assessment in one other country 
b. Workshop for UNDP CO staff on small arms and DDR
c. Pilot project in one country of the region
2. Support for international co
a. Support to the NS and Friends of Nairobi (e.g. DDR information briefing)
b. Advocacy with Great Lakes Peace Conference
3. Pilot projects to test regional approaches
a. Assessment of customs and border management capacity in two locations as 
preparation for a capacity development project
b. Follow up to the Training of Trainers workshop at the nationa
 
9.3 Elements to be considered for a new regional programme
The decision to develop a new regional programme is dependent on an external evaluation, in 
accordance with the current Project Document, as well as a brief needs assessment and internal 
and external consultation processes.  However, should UNDP decide to go ahead with a Phase 
II regional programme, this current progress assessment has the following recommendations:
 
1. Phase II should be more focused and targeted than the current programme.  
should be given to current office support and to the provision of seed funding and 
technical advice and assistance for country projects. National assessments could form 
the basis of such projects. The project could include the same countries, with
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The Phase II programme should also focus on 
building capacity in UNDP COs and within other UN organizations as appropriate.
2. The Phase II programme could include seed funding for pilot projects with a regional 
bi-national component, such as the development of capacity for border management and 
customs. Such pilot projects could be used to test approaches and develop best practice. 
They should focus on interaction and co
than the entire region at once. If successful, they can then be expanded at a later stage.
3. The compilation of lessons learned and best practices was intended to be part of SARP’s 
current work, but it has not been possible to fully develop this a
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included as a central element of Phase II, and could include the development of resource 
materials and guidelines for small arms projects and activities. However, it would be 
better if SADU were to take the lead on this, with a Phase II
refining materials for the Great Lakes context. The programme could also function as a 
clearinghouse for information, but should avoid taking on any co
4. Some continued support could be given to the Nairobi Secret
limited to joint project-related activities for which the two organizations could mobilize 
additional resources if necessary.  Further interaction with regional processes is not 
generally recommended, but this could be further exp
5. Any second phase should include a stronger focus on capacity building in DDR. 
Institutional capacity on DDR both within and outside UNDP is very limited.  A Phase II 
regional programme could play a useful role in providing training and materials on 
for international organizations, governments and civil society.
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Annex 1: Allocations 
 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund
Donor Date
Belgium 13/03/2002
Germany 09/07/2003
Netherlands 13/03/2002
Switzerland 02/04/2002
Switzerland 04/07/2003
UK 05/23/2002
Total 
 
 
Other allocations: TRAC 
Source 
TRAC 1.1.2 
 
 
Other allocations: Community Recovery in Support of 
Donor 
Belgium / Suballotment 
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 Amount in USD 
 293,176.00 
 142,900.00 
 505,500.00 
 173,214.00 
 245,000.00 
 376,676.00 
1,1736,466.00 
Amount in USD 
100,000.00 
the DRC Peace Process
Amount in USD 
980,185.50 
 
 
  
 
Annex 2: Terms of Reference
 
BCPR/SADU MISSION TO KENYA
Background 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the
Africa2 has exacerbated conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and elsewhere in the region. The proliferation of SALW has 
also increased the degree of violence by 
resulting culture of violence has obstructed peace efforts and delayed the launching of economic 
and social recovery in post-war societies in the region. Governments in the region have lacked 
the capacity to deal with illicit supplies and trafficking. The lack of alternative livelihoods for those 
who are involved in armed groups and the general lack of security, mean people are reluctant to 
surrender the weapons they hold.
 
A conference in Nairobi in March 2000 for 10 countries from the Horn and Great Lakes sub
regions resulted in the ‘Nairobi Declaration’, whereby the signatories undertook to share 
information and co-operate in matters relating to illicit small arms and light weapons and to 
exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons.   In 
order to support implementation of the Nairobi Declaration, as well as the DRC peace process, 
BCPR/SADU established the GLR Small Arms Regional Programme (SARP) in Jan
The Programme aims to build awareness of the problem of small arms proliferation in the Great 
Lakes within UNDP and its partners in the region, enhancing understanding of the impact on 
longer term development, integrating responses to the proble
programming and developing specific projects to tackle small arms proliferation. 
 
Since its inception, changing realities in the region have influenced the direction of the project.  
The signature of a global peace accord in DRC,
commencement of the DDRRR programme, and the involvement of donors in the Multi
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) has created a window of opportunity in 
the region, while at the same time inc
ordination.  SARP’s role within these processes, and the part to be played by small arms 
activities, still remain unclear.  Furthermore, the gradual operationalization of the Nairobi 
Secretariat during 2003 now means that SARP has a serious regional partner through which it 
can ensure more regional ownership.
 
Assessment Strategy 
The initial project foresaw monitoring and evaluation throughout project implementation, but 
there has been little systematic 
long overdue, and a more substantial external evaluation is also considered desirable in view of 
                                               
2
 For the purpose of this project, the Great Lakes Region is defined as all the countries directly involved in the DRC 
conflict and the countries that suffer impact of the DRC conflict through refugees, increased cross
and violence. 
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26 March – 1 April 2004 
 
 
 Great Lakes Region (GLR) of 
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m into UNDP’s longer term 
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evaluation since mid-2002. An internal assessment is therefore 
 
-
uary 2002. 
 
-Country 
-
-border trafficking 
  
 
political developments in the region. This preliminary assessment will therefore constrain itse
taking stock of progress achieved and challenges identified so far, and to the development of 
terms of reference for a full external evaluation which will assess efficiency and impact and make 
recommendations for the future of the project.
 
 Objectives 
1) To conduct a preliminary assessment of the first two years of SARP.
2) To draft terms of reference for an external evaluation of SARP.
3) Provide technical advice and assistance for the immediate term.
 
Output 
1) Preliminary assessment of SARP.
2) ToRs for an external evaluation of SARP.
 
Anticipated Activities 
The mission will meet officials from the UNDP Country Office, the SARP Project Team, the 
Nairobi Secretariat and relevant NGOs, as appropriate. 
 
Mission Composition  
Kate Joseph, UNDP/BCPR Regional Liaison 
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